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GINA’S GENOTYPES
David H. Kaye* †
In August 2009, the Board of Trustees of the University of Akron added
to the university’s employment policy the following proviso: “any applicant
may be asked to submit fingerprints or DNA sample for purpose of a federal
criminal background check.” Although the federal government does not do
background checks with DNA, the policy is significant because it highlights
a largely unexplored feature of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008 (“GINA”). Hailed by the late Senator Edward Kennedy as “the
first civil rights bill of the new century of life sciences,” GINA generally
prohibits employers from asking for “genetic information.” The faculty senate and outside commentators have declared that the Akron policy is “of
doubtful legality” because it “appears to violate” GINA. However, appearances can be deceptive. GINA’s ban on the acquisition of “genetic
information” also can be read so that it does not reach nonmedical DNA
tests. Because employers have nondiscriminatory reasons to use forensic
DNA identification technology, this narrower interpretation is more faithful
to the express purpose of the law.
I. Reasons for Employers to Collect
DNA Identification Profiles
A spokeswoman for the University of Akron justified potential DNA
sampling by suggesting that DNA would soon replace fingerprinting as the
main technology used for criminal identification: “By including it in the
policy we have the flexibility to match the technology if the Ohio State
Highway Patrol makes changes to its system.” But if this is what the trustees
were thinking, they were misinformed. Law enforcement agencies are not
soon likely to abandon fingerprinting as the routine form of personal identification. Advances in technology are improving automated comparisons of
fingerprints, while DNA identification profiling does not distinguish between monozygotic twins (a situation that occurs in about 4 out of every
1000 births).
Despite the vacuity of the University of Akron’s articulated basis for
collecting DNA, some employers have legitimate reasons to acquire DNA
information. A laboratory that performs forensic DNA typing, for instance,
might wish to build a database of its employees’ profiles so that the laboratory, the police, prosecutors, judges, and juries can be sure that the reported
*
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DNA profiles are free of contamination from the employees’ DNA. An extreme example of such contamination comes from “the Phantom of
Heilbronn.” Police in Germany linked DNA evidence from 40 crimes—
including the homicide of a policewoman in the southern German town of
Heilbronn—to the same woman. Her DNA was found in samples from items
ranging from a cookie to a heroin syringe to a stolen car. The police consulted diviners and fortune-tellers before they were able to match the
mysterious DNA profile with a worker at a factory in Austria that produced
cotton swabs used to collect DNA samples at crime scenes.
Employers other than forensic laboratories may have plausible reasons
to acquire DNA identification profiles from selected employees. New York
City already requires police officers who handle crime-scene materials to
provide DNA samples. Beyond identification for elimination purposes in
criminal investigations, a laboratory performing genetic tests for medical
diagnosis that experiences a problem with contamination might use employee DNA profiles to determine which employee is the source of the
extraneous DNA. Indeed, even employers who do not handle DNA samples
could find forensic DNA analysis of employees useful in internal investigations of theft or sexual conduct on company property. Suppose that an
employee complains that she believes that a coworker, who made unwelcome advances toward her, anonymously sent her parents a used condom
with a vulgar note stating that the condom belonged to her boyfriend. The
complaining employee gives the condom to the employer, who has it analyzed for DNA. If the profile does not correspond to the boyfriend’s, the
employer might well request that the alleged harasser submit a DNA sample
or profile. Although this example may seem contrived, it parallels the facts
1
in In re McClain. In the case, the Indiana Supreme Court removed a judge
from office because he “engaged in a pattern of harassment and abuse of
office directed toward a female court employee and her family and boyfriend.” In its investigation, the state judicial qualifications commission
asked for a blood sample, and the supreme court emphasized that unwillingness to cooperate “may in itself constitute independent grounds for
disciplinary charges.” Thus, McClain reveals that employers can reasonably
request or require employees to provide DNA samples or profiles for identification purposes.
II. GINA as a Bar to Collecting DNA Identification Profiles
A. The Purpose of the Law
Although at first blush, the Akron policy appears to violate GINA’s proscriptions, a closer analysis reveals that DNA testing strictly for
identification does not conflict with the underlying goals of the statute. The
legal pundits who have spoken out on the Akron policy have condemned it.

1.

662 N.E.2d 935 (Ind. 1996).
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An attorney and consultant for Johns Hopkins University’s Genetics and
Public Policy Center opined that:
GINA clearly prohibits the collection of a DNA sample from employees or
prospective employees by the University of Akron . . . . One of the primary
targets for GINA was employers collecting genetic information from [employees] and using it to make decisions about hiring and firing and
promotions. It’s that kind of discrimination that GINA was designed to
prohibit.

But is an employer’s use of the DNA loci whose variations are recorded in
criminal-offender databases—loci that have no significant medical applica2
tions —really the “kind of discrimination that GINA was designed to
prohibit”? The Act is concerned with medical information, not biometric
information. Section 2 explains that Congress was worried about “[n]ew
knowledge about the genetic basis of illness [allowing] for earlier detection
of illnesses, often before symptoms have begun, [thus giving] rise to the
potential misuse of genetic information to discriminate in health insurance
and employment.” Congress listed examples of discrimination including:
“sterilization laws by the States based on early genetic science,” actions
taken against individuals with an allele for sickle cell anemia, and more recent cases in which employers allegedly performed genetic tests relating to
specific medical conditions. Thus, GINA’s stated objective is to establish “a
national and uniform basic standard . . . to fully protect the public from discrimination and to allay concerns about the potential for discrimination,
thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.”
B. The Statute as Prophylaxis
It is hard to imagine how the Akron policy would discourage individuals
from seeking appropriate medical care or volunteering for genetic research.
Still, potential employees might worry that if the university has samples of
their DNA, it could use them—not for criminal background checks—but for
rejecting their applications on the basis of genetic tests that indicate increased risk for certain diseases. Although the attempt to distinguish
between using genetic and nongenetic medical information in employment
3
decisions is fundamentally flawed, using a sample collected for identification purposes to limit employment opportunities because of medically
relevant tests is the kind of “discrimination” that “GINA was designed to
prohibit.”
Consequently, the question becomes whether Congress chose to ban, as
a prophylactic measure, the collection of cells from job applicants because
2. David H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of
Private Information, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 70 (2007); David H. Kaye, Mopping Up After
Coming Clean About “Junk DNA”, Nov. 23, 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032094.
3. Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.
L., Med. & Ethics, No. 4 (2008); Note, Recent Legislation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1038 (2009).
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of the risk that an employer might engage in such conduct. The president of
the Council for Responsive Genetics has suggested that Congress did exactly this. He argues that because “GINA specifically prohibits employers
from requesting or requiring genetic information” and “does not draw a distinction about how the DNA sample could be or should be used,” it follows
that employers may not request DNA samples from present or prospective
employees.
The premise of this argument is correct. GINA makes it generally illegal
for “an employer to request, require, or purchase genetic information with
respect to an individual” (emphasis added). Nonetheless, although some
4
bioethicists maintain that a DNA molecule is itself genetic information,
GINA does not explicitly prohibit the acquisition and storage of “information” in this extended sense. Instead, GINA defines “genetic information” as
“information about [an] individual’s genetic tests.” It defines a “genetic
test” as “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.”
Plainly, the tested sample—that is, the biological material taken from the
employee—is neither a genetic test nor information about that test.
C. Defining Mutations and Genotypes in Science and Law
Because the DNA sample is not itself “genetic information,” we must
ascertain whether asking for a DNA sample for identification purposes constitutes requesting “genetic information” within the meaning of the statute. I
shall consider three modes of interpretation—literal, intentional, and purposive. A literalist could argue that the words “mutations” and “genotypes”
clearly encompass identification testing. Biologically, all genetic variation
in a population results from mutations. Furthermore, forensic scientists have
been known to refer to the medically uninformative alleles used in DNA
5
identification testing as “DNA genotypes.”
Yet, “genotype” usually refers to a gene—a long (and possibly interrupted) sequence of DNA that guides the production of proteins in cells,
thus generating observable effects or traits (“phenotypes”) in the organism.
Because the DNA variations used for identification—particular shorttandem-repeat (“STR”) alleles—produce no differences in phenotypes, it is
odd to characterize them as genotypes. The justification for doing so is that
even nonsense DNA sequences are inherited in the same manner as the classical genes that influence physical traits. That the STRs are subject to
Mendel’s laws, however, does not mean that they are genotypes. The sequences used for identification do not work like genes, which influence
phenotypes. Thus, the literalist analysis is inconclusive.

4. Scott Burris & Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic Screening from a Public Health
Perspective 137, 139 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1999); P. Reilly, Rethinking Risks to Human Subjects
in Genetic Research, 63 Am. J. Human Genetics 682 (1998).
5.

David H. Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence 37, 41-42 (2010).
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A deeper problem with blindly importing a scientific definition is that it
divorces text from context, producing an interpretation of “genetic information” that is not faithful to the purpose of the law or the intent of its drafters.
As noted earlier, GINA is concerned with what are popularly known as disease mutations—changes in functional DNA sequences that affect an
individual’s disease status—or markers for those mutations. Why, then,
should GINA be construed to reach tests for DNA variations that are not
themselves genes? The answer does not lie in genetics textbooks or dictionaries of biology. A scientific term in a statute need not function the same
6
way it does in biology. In Nix v. Hedden, for instance, the Supreme Court
had no difficulty classifying a tomato as a vegetable under the Tariff Act of
March 3, 1883, although botanists regard a tomato as a fruit.
Generally, to give content to technical or scientific terms that might have
been used imprecisely in legislation, courts look to the evils that the statute
7
is designed to mitigate. A purposive analysis emphasizes that GINA is a
“civil rights law” intended to eliminate “discrimination” against asymptomatic individuals. Because the STR profiles used in identification are not
variations in genes and carry no medical information that would be valuable
for prediction or diagnosis, it is not immediately clear that Congress used
the words “genetic information,” “genotype,” or even “mutations,” to prohibit employers from requiring employees to provide an identifying STR
profile.
D. And Yet . . .
Despite this conclusion, the theory that STR profiles are not genetic information (as opposed to genomic information) is subject to a major
objection. Section 202(b)(6) explicitly allows an employer to acquire genetic information “where the employer conducts DNA analysis for law
enforcement purposes as a forensic laboratory or for purposes of human
remains identification, and requests or requires genetic information of such
employer’s employees, but only to the extent that such genetic information
is used for analysis of DNA identification markers for quality control to detect sample contamination.” Why would Congress include this exception if
“genetic information” is confined to information about genes? If Congress
found it expedient to have an exception for some loci that are not genes,
then it must have intended the word “genetic” to reach all manner of “mutations.”
Although initially appealing, this intent-based analysis is not ultimately
persuasive. Several explanations for the law-enforcement and humanremains exceptions are available. First, Congress might have understood
“genetic information” to be limited to the activity of genes, but adopted the
6.

149 U.S. 304 (1893).

7. E.g., United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a chemical
definition of “cocaine base” for criminal sentencing purposes in light of Congressional concern with
other properties of crack cocaine).
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exception as a response to the possibility, stressed by some legal commentators, that the loci used for identification have (or will turn out to have)
8
medical diagnostic or predictive value. Legislators sharing this belief may
have wanted to include the exception to forestall the need to amend the law
in the future. Second, the sponsors of the bill may have believed that the
exception was not strictly necessary in light of their understanding of “genetic information” but still included it to circumvent any opposition from
the law-enforcement and military lobbies. Finally, and most likely, individual legislators may not have had any view about the distinction between
genomic and genetic information, but perceived no reason not to include the
quality-control exception of section 202(b)(6) for laboratories conducting
law enforcement and human remains testing.
It is risky to try and guess what was in the minds of individual legislators, let alone discern Congressional intent regarding a matter that received
very little attention and no debate. Rather than seek the mythical, subjective
intent of individuals who never considered the issue, it seems better to adopt
the purposive mode of interpretation. The point of the law is what matters.
The phrase “genetic information” should be read so as to achieve the best fit
between the statute and its goals. As stated countless times in committee, in
floor debate, in public announcements, and most importantly, in the Act itself, GINA’s goal is not to regulate the flow of information about loci that
are irrelevant to any action based on medically significant loci. The statutory goal is to keep insurers and employers from making adverse decisions
based on information, gleaned from testing genes or markers for genes,
about the future health of a currently asymptomatic individual. To prevent
such “discrimination” (and only such discrimination), GINA also blocks the
acquisition of this “genetic information.” Fidelity to this statutory purpose
suggests that neither this ancillary ban on acquisition of information nor the
primary ban on use extends to nonmedical information, even if it happens to
come from a limited inspection of the genome. DNA features that serve only
as personal identifiers are not “genetic information” within the meaning of
the statute.
III. Toward a Broader Exception
Despite the cramped phrasing of section 202(b)(6), the provision actually conforms to the manifest purpose of the statutory system. When GINA’s
drafters actually confronted an instance of nonmedical information, they
explicitly allowed employers to acquire the information. A purposive construction of GINA’s words suggests that the outcome should be the same in
other situations that involve only nonmedical information. Of course, textualists might reject this conclusion. If one were to treat the absence of
explicit exceptions for similar uses of data on DNA features that are
8. E.g., Simon A. Cole, Is the ‘Junk’ Designation Bunk?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy
54, 54 (2007), Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857 (2006).
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unrelated to the statute’s goals as if it were a legislative rejection of such
exceptions, then it would be necessary to ask whether Congress should return to the drafting board.
Whether and how to protect job applicants or employees who do not
wish to supply a DNA identification profile are significant questions. In my
view, when the procedures for collecting and analyzing DNA ensure that no
medically related information that could affect employment status, conditions, or benefits will come into existence, then a “nondiscrimination” law
such as GINA should not tie an employer’s hands. Thus, a forensic laboratory—or other kind of laboratory—should be permitted to require its
workers to provide their STR profiles for the purpose of laying to rest any
suggestion that they have contaminated a sample with their own DNA.
GINA explicitly recognizes this for some laboratories that do criminal case
work or identify human remains, but the section 202(b)(6) exception for
“quality control” applies only to employers who themselves “conduct[]
DNA analysis for law enforcement purposes as a forensic laboratory or for
purposes of human remains identification.” The police agency whose officers or evidence technicians collect DNA traces at crime scenes do not fall
within this exemption. Neither do firms that produce the materials used by
these agencies or by laboratories that analyze crime stains. The many laboratories providing DNA tests in cases of disputed parentage and other civil
matters also will find the exception of no avail. Still other laboratories performing medical DNA tests that could be compromised by contamination
will be unable to determine the specific source of the contamination using
DNA identification methods. And, of course, the exception is useless for
internal investigations of serious misconduct in cases like McClain.
If the purposive reading of GINA were found wanting, one solution would
be for Congress to craft a broader, explicit exception that lists all the situations
in which an employer’s acquisition of genetic information does not threaten to
produce “genetic discrimination” involving medical conditions in insurance
and employment. But fully enumerating all the relevant exceptions could
prove difficult. As experience with rape-shield laws demonstrate, the everything-is-forbidden-except-that-which-is-explicitly-allowed approach tends to
9
be overly restrictive. A more flexible solution would be to eliminate the
cramped law-enforcement exception and to define “genetic information” (or
replace it with a more transparent phrase) so that DNA identification profiles
are not treated as if they were the disease-related “genotypes” or “mutations” that are GINA’s true target. GINA is not a general genetic-privacy
law. It is a nondiscrimination law. Judicially or legislatively, the definitions
should be aligned so that “the first civil rights bill of the new century of life
sciences” stays on target.

9. See, e.g., Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986).

